

17 June 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: D/DCI/NI
FROM : NIO/USSR-EE
SUBJECT : DIOs

1. It is difficult for us to comment on the DIOs as an institution because our DIO counterpart is uniquely (we hope) a spokesman for a point of view, rather than a senior staff officer dealing with the full range of our counterpart substantive and bureaucratic portfolio in DIA and the DOD. Dealings with our DIO have usually been an exercise in coping appropriately with attempts to register a position on Soviet objectives (global dominance,) and only occasionally an experience in coping together with common (other) problems. Unfortunately, after the first few experiences with the strategic objectives litany, we have taken the cowardly way out and sought out our DIO only when required (i.e., on estimates in which she is interested.) It is quite possible that we have proceeded unaware of all sorts of help and advice she might have provided on various problems and efforts, because we were afraid of getting swept up in the process into more of her proselytizing on the Soviet world domination theme. In fact, on the one (desparate) occasion we can recall soliciting her help -- to fend off an unneeded and probably counter-productive FOCUS exercise on Moscow -- she did promptly and helpfully line up herself and DIA against the effort.

2. As regards 1.b. (DIO support to the Director, DIA,) we are not qualified to say. We have the impression that Danny found the DIOs very useful substantive and bureaucratic emissaries throughout the DOD establishment, and that they have been used less actively and effectively since his departure. We do vividly recall one stunning

instance in which Soviet/European DIO service to Director/DIA involved a DNIE she authored ("Soviet Strategic Objectives,") which took a hard line on the intelligence subject, weighed in with explicit advice on the policy issue of how to cope with the Soviets, was issued around town in an unclassified version, and wound up on the President's desk as a hot item in his grievance list of Pentagon sabotage of his foreign policy.


3. Re l.c. (DIO ability to ensure effective and coordinated Defense inputs to national intelligence) our experience has been, on NIEs and SNIEs, to go through the arduous (but usual) process of getting rather reasonable DIA and service reps on board, with the DIO the single standout who was sometimes able (with Danny) to get the Director, DIA to adopt major objections to the paper at the pre USIB and USIB stage. Or to have the DIO dictate the DIA position on an estimate from the outset in clear opposition to the views of the DIA rep. In short, our DIO's relations with DIA/DE are so bad that she complicates, rather than facilitates getting a timely, coordinated DIA view when we need one. National production in which our DIO has not been interested has generally gone more smoothly.

4. To be serious, it depends on the DIO; we are aware that others (especially SE Asia/Korea) have had happier experiences.



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(Dick -  ok'd this, but should not be held responsible for the specific intemperate language!)